Edges
ADCSESC1
This edge indicates that the principal has permission to enroll on one or more certificate templates, allowing them to specify an alternate subject name and use the certificate for authentication. They also have enrollment permission for an enterprise CA with the necessary templates published.
This enterprise CA is trusted for NT authentication in the forest, along with the certificate chain up to the root CA certificate. This setup lets the principal enroll certificates for any AD forest user or computer, enabling authentication and impersonation of any AD forest user or computer without their credentials.
Abuse Info
Windows
Step 1: Use Certify to request enrollment in the affected template, specifying the affected certification authority and target principal to impersonate:Linux
Step 1: Use Certipy to request enrollment in the affected template, specifying the target enterprise CA and target principal to impersonate:Opsec Considerations
When the affected certificate authority issues the certificate to the attacker, it will retain a local copy of that certificate in its issued certificates store. Defenders may analyze those issued certificates to identify illegitimately issued certificates and identify the principal that requested the certificate, as well as the target identity the attacker is attempting to impersonate.References
This edge is related to the following MITRE ATT&CK tactic and techniques:Abuse and Opsec references
- Certipy
- Rubeus
- https://specterops.io/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2022/06/Certified_Pre-Owned.pdf
- https://book.hacktricks.xyz/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/ad-certificates/domain-escalation#misconfigured-certificate-templates-esc1
- https://hideandsec.sh/books/cheatsheets-82c/page/active-directory-certificate-ser