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Applies to BloodHound Enterprise and CE

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Edge Schema

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General Information

The traversable GH_CanPwnRequest edge indicates that a repository role can exploit a pwn-requestable workflow to execute arbitrary code with the base branch’s secrets, GITHUB_TOKEN permissions, and OIDC identity. This is a computed edge that combines workflow analysis with repository access and fork policy evaluation.

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Pwn Request Conditions

A workflow is considered pwn-requestable (is_pwn_requestable = true) when all of the following are true:
  1. pull_request_target trigger: The workflow is triggered by pull_request_target, which runs in the context of the base branch and has access to the base branch’s secrets and permissions.
  2. Attacker-controlled checkout: A step uses actions/checkout with a ref parameter pointing to the pull request head, meaning attacker-supplied code from the fork replaces the trusted repository contents. Detected ref patterns:
    • ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.sha }}
    • ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.ref }}
    • ${{ github.head_ref }}

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Edge Drawing Conditions

An edge is drawn from a GH_RepoRole to the repository and its branches when:
  1. Read access: The role has a GH_ReadRepoContents edge to the repository.
  2. Forkability: The repository can be forked by the role holder.
  3. Pwn-requestable workflow: The repository has at least one workflow with is_pwn_requestable = true.

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Attack Impact

An attacker who exploits a pwn request gains code execution in the workflow runner with access to:
  • Repository secrets scoped to the base branch
  • Organization secrets accessible by the repository
  • GITHUB_TOKEN with the workflow’s declared permissions
  • OIDC tokens if id-token: write is set, enabling cloud identity assumption via GH_CanAssumeIdentity
  • Environment secrets if the workflow job targets a deployment environment

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Caveats

  • OIDC traversal requires id-token: write: The attack chain from GH_CanPwnRequest through GH_CanAssumeIdentity to a cloud role is only valid if the pwn-requestable workflow or job explicitly declares id-token: write.
  • GITHUB_TOKEN permissions: The permissions: block controls what the token can do, but does not limit secret access, OIDC token requests, or arbitrary code execution.